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Abstract 
Resilience and vulnerability of networked infrastructures are strictly linked: while resilience is focused on a general evaluation of 
the robustness of the entire infrastructure, vulnerability is associated with a specific component, or set of components, to 
represent the possibility of being influenced by hazards/threats and the severity of the possible consequences.  
In the proposed framework, complex network theory is used to evaluate resilience and vulnerability of a WDN (structural 
connectivity) while hydraulic simulation (EPANET) is adopted to estimate the potential stress on pipes according to the level of 
service of the WDN. The aim is to provide a decision support functionality to assist the definition of intervention planby ranking 
pipes according to integrated information on vulnerability/resilience and hydraulic stress. The proposed framework, developed 
within the ICeWater project, has been evaluated on both benchmark and two real world WDNs (pilots in Timisoara and Milan), 
starting from their hydraulic software models. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Peer-review under responsibility of the Scientific Committee of CCWI 2015. 
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1. Introduction 
Resilience and vulnerability of networked infrastructure are two issues strictly linked: while resilience is more 
focused on a general evaluation of the robustness on the entire infrastructure, (“infrastructure resilience is the ability 
to reduce the magnitude and/or duration of disruptive events. The effectiveness of a resilient infrastructure or 
enterprise depends upon its ability to anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and/or rapidly recover from a potentially 
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disruptive event” [1]), vulnerability is associated with a specific component or a set of components (subsystem) of 
the infrastructure to represent the possibility, and the correlated consequences, of being influenced by 
hazards/threats and the severity of the possible consequences [2]. Resilience and vulnerability of a Water 
Distribution Network (WDN) are critical not only for the system itself but also with respect to the possibility to 
propagate cascading failures on other linked urban infrastructures, (i.e., roadways, sewer lines and sewage treatment, 
electric power distribution, gas mains, telecommunications lines) even with greater intensity (3.4 times) [3][4]. The 
growing awareness of the interplay between global (system-wide) and local (individual component) reliability and 
the relevance of cascading effects among system components and/or among connected complex systems have 
spawned a specific line of research, focused on power/energy grids [5], transportation system [6] and water [7][8].  
The authors propose a framework based on complex network theory to evaluate both resilience and vulnerability of 
a WDN, while hydraulic simulation (EPANET) is adopted in order to estimate the potential stress on the hydraulic 
components (i.e. pipes) according to the level of service provided by the water distribution system. With respect to 
the complex network analysis theory, general measures are used to evaluate structural connectivity of the WDN 
(resilience), while Spectral Clustering is used to identify the most critical pipes, whose breakage imply structural 
disconnection and consequent failure of the distribution service (vulnerability). While the resilience/vulnerability 
measures permit to estimate how the failure of a single component affects the connectivity, the hydraulic simulation 
permits to estimate the chance of breakage/failure of each pipe according to the current usage behavior in the WDN. 
The final aim of this framework is to enable an enhanced asset management, through a decision support 
functionality to assist WDN managers in the definition of the most suitable intervention/rehabilitation plan, even 
preventive. WDN managers will be able to prioritize the hydraulic components according to integrated information 
on vulnerability/resilience and chance for a damage. The proposed framework has been evaluated on both 
benchmark and real world WDNs, starting from their hydraulic software models, considering breakages on pipes as 
relevant disruptive events. This framework has been developed within the ICeWater project and validated on the 
two whose use cases in Timisoara and Milan. 
1.1. Graph Theory 
Let denote a graph with G = (V, E), where V is the set of nodes and E is the set of edges. Each edge of G is 
represented by a pair of nodes (i, j) with i ≠ j, and i, jא V and i, j = 1, .., n, where n=|V|. If (i, j) א E, i and j are called 
adjacent nodes. The adjacency relationship between the nodes of G can be represented through a non-negative n x n 
matrix A (i.e., the adjacency matrix of G). The entry aij of the adjacency matrix A is 1 if i and j are adjacent nodes 
(i.e., (i, j) א E), and 0 otherwise. Moreover, aij = aji if G is undirected and aii (entries on the diagonal) are 0 if G is 
simple, that is no self-loops are admitted (edges starting from a node and ending on the same node) and only one 
edge can exist between each pair of nodes (i, j), with i ≠ j. 
Let denote with degree of the node i the number of edges having i as one of the two nodes of the edge. Anyone of 
the edges having i as one of its nodes is called incident on i. When order of the nodes in the edge definition is 
important (directed graph), degree of the node i can be split into out-degree (number of edges having i as first node) 
and in-degree (number of edges having i as second node). 
A path from i to j is a sequence of distinct adjacent nodes starting from i and ending to j. The shortest path 
between i and j is the one related to the shortest list of adjacent nodes from i to j, and it is usually named distance 
d(i, j). The largest distance among each possible pair of nodes in G is named diameter. 
A connected graph is a graph where a path exists between each pair of nodes i, j א V. A subgraph G’ = (V’, E’) 
of G is a graph such that V’ك V and E’ك E; a connected component of G is a maximal connected subgraph of G. If 
the original graph G is connected it consists of just one connected component. 
In addition to mere adjacency, a weight wij ≥ 0 can be associated with every edge (i, j) א E; in this case the graph 
G is called weighted and the (weighted) adjacency matrix is an n x n matrix W having wii = 0, if G is simple, wij ≥ 0 
and wij = wji for each i ≠ j if G is undirected. In the case of weighted graphs, the previous definitions, related to 
degree, path and diameter, are modified in order to take into account weights on the edges rather than their number. 
In particular, degree of the node i is the sum of the weights of the edges incident on i (out-degree is the sum of the 
weights of the edges starting from i, while in-degree is the sum of the weights of the edges ending to i); shortest path 
between i and j is the list of adjacent nodes from i to j with minimal sum of the weights on the correspondent 
connecting edges; the diameter is the largest shortest path computed as just defined. 
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Networks from different domains, from social networks to urban infrastructures (e.g. energy, water, transport, 
etc.), share some properties which can measured by a set of indices, characterized by different ranges of values 
according to the specific domain. Some properties are more related to nodes and their “relevance” into the network, 
some others are more focused on the entire connectivity/linkage of the overall structure. 
1.2. Node-related measures 
Starting from the nodes, the basic information is related to their degree; the degree distribution P(degree) of a 
network gives the relative frequencies of the different node degrees into the network. Real networks often show a 
skewed node-degree distribution, with most of the nodes having few links and only few nodes are extremely 
connected. This heavy tailed distribution is known as Power-law or Scale-free distribution. 
As a basic measure of connectivity, the average degree (degreeavg) can provide an immediate information about 
the organization of the network: it is near to 2 in planar networks and usually higher in more “intricate” networks. 
Moreover, this measure is also linked to the link-per-node ratio (e) which is computed as the number of edges of a 
graph with respect to the number of its nodes: it is near to 1 for planar networks. 
Density (q) is an important measure related to the overall structure of the network, it quantifies how much the 
nodes of the graph are connected among them. Given a graph G=(V, E), its density is simply computed as the ratio 
between the number of edges of the graph, m=|E|, and the overall possible number of connections among the n=|V| 
nodes of G (i.e., n(n-1)/2 in case of undirected graph): 
 1
2
 nn
mq  (1) 
The density measure varies between 0 and 1, and when it is 1, G is called complete (i.e., any nodes is directly 
linked to every other node of the graph). 
1.3. Connectivity-related measures 
By taking into account connectivity information based on edges rather than nodes, measures related to the 
network organization can be computed based on betweenness centrality. Betweenness centrality can be computed 
for each node or edge (edge-betweenness); it can be simply defined as the number of all the shortest paths that pass 
through that node or edge, respectively. Central point dominance (cb’), based on betweenness centrality, has been 
proposed as a measure for characterizing the organization of a network according to its path-related connectivity; in 
particular it is computed as the mean over the betweenness centrality values of all nodes indexed by the maximum 
value of betweenness (that is that of the most central node): 
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where bi is the betweenness centrality of the node i, bmax is the maximum value of betweennees centrality over all 
the n nodes of the network. 
The edge betweenness is really important because the edges connecting different “communities” (in a social 
network setting) will have high edge betweenness and probably belong to the edge cut-set (introduced in the next 
section): this is the fundamental idea of the algorithm for community discovery proposed by Girvan-Newman [9]. 
On the other hand, other kind of algorithms have been developed in order to identify the cut-set and, consequently, 
identify relevant sub-networks, such as Spectral Clustering [10]. 
 
The evaluation of network resilience and vulnerability issues requires to extend the analysis in order to include 
more complex structural properties, such as cycles, as an indicator of network redundancy. Respect to this, the 
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clustering coefficient (c) is used to characterize resilience of a network according to loops of length three and is 
computed as the number of triangles (Ntriangles) with respect to the overall number of possible connected triples 
(Ntriples), where a triple consists of three nodes connected at least by two edges while a triangle consists of three 
nodes connected exactly by three edges (complete subgraph): 
triples
triangles
N
N
c
3  (3) 
1.4. A WDN as a graph: from the hydraulic to the graph model 
The basic structural information needed to represent a WDN as a graph is generally stored in a Geographical 
Information Systems (GIS) or a software for hydraulic simulations. For the WDNs considered in this paper, their 
corresponding hydraulic models were available, built through the open source software EPANET developed by the 
Environmental Protection Agency, EPA, (http://www.epa.gov/nrmrl/wswrd/dw/epanet.html). 
A generic EPANET network model consists of a number of logic components: reservoirs and tanks, pumps, 
control valves, junctions (that can be physical junctions between different pipes or consumption points) and pipes. In 
the following figure, on the left side, a generic EPANET network model showing the different hydraulic 
components; on the right side a possible mapping into a corresponding graph. The mapping from EPANET to the 
graph model allows some options, for instance a valve may be mapped as an edge of the graph or a node; in the first 
case, when the valve is closed the correspondent edge is no more into the graph, while in the second case the 
correspondent node disappears together with the incident edges, therefore the overall “hydraulic” effect is the same. 
In particular, the valve-to-edge mapping has been used in this study; this permits to use a lower number of edges 
with respect to the alternative choice. 
 
 
Fig. 1. From hydraulic model of a WDN to thee correspondent graph model 
Although a simple undirected graph is enough to perform most of the analytical tasks, such as sectorization and 
evaluation of resilience/vulnerability, more advanced analysis may be performed taking into account results from 
software simulations, such as flow into the pipes, and building a directed and weighted graph [11]. 
1.5. General results on WDNs 
According to the almost direct correspondence between a WDN and a graph, complex network analysis can be 
performed to address structural evaluation and water distribution systems comparison. Respect to this, a recent 
significant work has been done by Yazdani and Jeffrey [12], where a set of four real life networks has been 
characterized and compared with respect to several structural indices. 
Most of the WDNs have planar graph structures, where planarity defines specific constraints on the network 
connectivity and layout. WDN are planar by construction, where its edges intersect only at a node mutually incident 
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with them; therefore, they usually do not show any Power-low or Scale-free distribution. A recent work of [13] 
reports that pipe lengths into a WDN tend to obey the Power Law (even more when length is categorized in classes) 
but not the graph representing the WDN. The results have been obtained on 30 municipalities in Norway; although, 
not sufficient to draw conclusions and generalizations, these results proved to be interesting in order to characterize 
a WDN. The result is mainly due to the fact that short and medium length pipes are usually expected at grid-like 
sub-networks near the city centers or urban areas, with few long size pipes carrying water from peripheral 
reservoirs. 
Furthermore, WDNs usually are sparse, showing very low values of link density (q), average node degree 
(degreeavg) equals to 2 and a link-per-node ratio (e) between 1 and 2. Planarity in WDNs also affects measures based 
on betweenness, such as central-point dominance (cb’); although creating hubs makes more economic and effective 
the water resource distribution, it compromises network resilience depending on the possible failure of the central 
node. Respect to this, WDNs having highly centralized structures are quite rare and their cb’ is usually near to 0, this 
implies that random removal of nodes in the graph (faulting nodes into the WDN) does not cause cascading failures, 
also known as avalanche breakdown. Analogously, the clustering coefficient (c) is usually very low, near to 0, in 
real world WDNs, because the dominant loops have length 4 rather than 3.  
 
The study of resilience/vulnerability of a WDN is usually based on a deeper analysis on the infrastructure 
connectivity. As the most critical goal is to guarantee a satisfactory level of water supply service, the identification 
of the elements that, if compromised, could isolate zones or affect the service is the main analytical task. This is 
usually performed by detecting the node or edge cut-set, that is the minimum weighted set of components 
(respectively nodes or pipes) whose removal from the network entails a physical disconnection (generating more 
than one connected components). The lower the size of the cut-set (i.e., minimum number of failures, breakages or 
attacks), the higher the vulnerability of the network. 
The most effective strategy to identify the minimum cut-set, in particular edge cut-set, is by analyzing the 
spectrum of the adjacency matrix of the WDN. In particular, spectral gap and algebraic connectivity are the two 
main parameters used to evaluate network resilience. The former is defined as the difference between the first and 
the second eigen-value of the adjacency matrix A and the latter is the second smallest eigen-value of the Laplacian 
matrix L or the normalized Laplacian Lnorm defined respectively as: L = D – A and Lnorm = I – D-1/2AD-1/2, and 
where D is the degree matrix having degree of node i in position (i, i) and zero otherwise. 
The larger algebraic connectivity the greater network resilience; similarly, the smaller spectral gap the lower 
connectivity. Algebraic connectivity is also the base of the spectral clustering algorithm [10] useful to identify the 
edge min cut-set needed to perform a bi-partitioning of a graph, as reported in [14][15]. Starting from this result, a 
recursive bi-partitioning spectral clustering algorithm has been proposed [16] to perform partitioning in more than 
two groups (usually known as K-way graph cuts). However this approach requires the computation of matrices and 
eigenvalues, as well as the use of the Fielder vector, for each sub-networks until the desired number of groups is 
reached. Another algorithm (Shi and Malik, 2000) consists in selecting the l smallest non-zero eigenvalues and 
performing a traditional k-means clustering on the resulting dataset having the same number of rows (that are initial 
instances) and only l columns (eigenvectors corresponding to the l smallest eigenvalues). 
As reported in [12], the size of the cut-set is usually trivial and equal to one. This result occurs because most of 
the end-users are supplied by single connections. In order to avoid this drawback, a preliminary preprocessing can 
be performed by cutting the final connections of the primary network, usually the links between the consumption 
meters of each building and the main distribution pipes. Then, graph clustering algorithms may be adopted in order 
to identify the hydraulic link which may entail structural disconnections if they fail [18]. In this paper, the open-
source software Cytoscape (http://www.cytoscape.org/) has been adopted as the basic tool of the analytical 
framework proposed. 
2. Experimental setting 
Measures and structural properties of 3 WDNs have been analyzed. The first WDN is a benchmark model 
adopted in many studies, namely Anytown: 
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 (http://emps.exeter.ac.uk/engineering/research/cws/resources/benchmarks/expansion/anytown.html) 
The other 2 WDNs are the pilot zones of the FP7 European project ICeWater (www.icewater-project.eu), two 
portions of two larger WDNs: Neptun is a small DMA in the town of Timisoara (Romania) while Abbiategrasso is a 
PMZ in Milan (Italy), wider than Neptun. The EPANET model of Abbiategrasso consists of 1212 junctions, 1385 
pipes and 4 valves; it has only one pumping system and no further tanks are installed. The EPANET model of 
Neptun consists of 335 junctions, 312 pipes and 27 valves; it has only one pumping system and no further tanks are 
installed. Finally, Anytown consists of 22 junctions and 43 pipes; it has 1 pumping system and 2 tanks are also 
modelled. 
The 3 different WDNs are depicted in the following figures, as modeled and visualized by EPANET. 
 
Fig. 2. Anytown WDN 
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Fig. 3. Neptun: a DMA of the WDN in Timisoara, one of the two pilots of the ICeWater project 
 
 
Fig. 4. Abbiategrasso: a PMZ of the WDN in Milan, one of the two pilots of the ICeWater project 
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3. Results 
In this section the results about the network analysis performed on the 3 different WDNs are reported. The 
following table 1 reports the values of relevant measures computed to compare structural properties, resilience and 
vulnerability of the WDNs. 
Table 1. Structural Analysis of three WDNs 
Measure Anytown ICeWater-Neptune (Timisoara) 
ICeWater-Abbiategrasso 
(Milan) 
Density (q) 0.186 0.005 0.001 
Link-per-node ratio (e) 1.954 0.992 1.156 
Central point dominance (cb’) 0.230 0.476 0.303 
Clustering coefficient (c) 0.303 0.000 0.004 
Diameter  7 82 83 
Characteristic Path Length  2.761 30.266 31.233 
Spectral Gap 1.5149 0.0149 0.2132 
Algebraic Connectivity 0.1708 0.0009 0.0002 
 
According to the table 1, results obtained on our real WDNs are really similar to how reported by Yazdani and 
Jeffrey [12], in particular the Anytown network, often used as benchmark in most research studies in literature, 
looks more like a “Notown” network, with structural properties really far from those of the actual WDNs. 
The two pilot zones are strongly sparse (with density q lower or equal to 0.005) with respect to Anytown (density 
q around 0.2). Also the link-per-node ratio e, for the real world WDNs, is more congruent with how reported by 
Yazdani and Jeffrey [12], that is equal to 1 for planar networks (such as those for energy, gas and water supply), 
while it is around 2 for Anytown. The central point dominance cb’, instead, is quite similar among all the three 
WDNs taken into account. The clustering coefficient c, diameter d and characteristic path length are significantly 
similar among the two pilot zones and different from those computed on Anytown. The main reason is that the two 
pilot zones are effectively planar and wider than Anytown. The computed values of spectral gap and algebraic 
connectivity confirm the high density of the Anytown WDN and its consequent high resilience. For the two pilot 
zones, although the algebraic connectivity is quite similar, the spectral gap is just a bit higher for Neptun showing a 
more meshed infrastructure. 
Previous measures are useful to characterize a WDN with respect to its global connectivity, in particular spectral 
gap and algebraic connectivity can be used to estimate the network-wide resilience to pipelines failures (i.e., 
interruption in the flow). On the other hand, graph clustering approaches, such as Spectral Clustering, and 
connectivity based measures such as edge betweenness can be used to identify the specific links (pipelines) whose 
removal may induce a disconnection of the network in two or more sub-networks. 
 
Finally, hydraulic simulation is used in order to estimate velocity and flow on each pipe; pipes with higher 
variation in terms of velocity, and modification in flow direction during the day, are identified as the pipe with high 
hydraulic stress. In the ICeWater project, results from network analysis and hydraulic simulation have been 
combined in order to provide WDN managers with a useful tool to prioritize intervention, even preventive, 
according to their preferences: defining intervention plans more focused on short-medium (resilience/vulnerability 
and strain evaluation) or long term (resilience/vulnerability). Through a web graphical user interface, the user (i.e., 
the WDN manager) may set the relevance of each risk factor through a slider. The different analyses are performed 
and finally the hydraulic components (i.e., pipes) are ordered by decreasing overall risk, computed as the weighted 
average of the individual risks and where weights are the relevance values set by the users. Then, manager may 
decide which are the pipes to be investigated and, eventually, repaired/replaced according to their risk and possible 
budget constraints. 
The following figures shows the results provided by the web services for the two pilot zones of ICeWater and 
according to different settings of the relevance for resilience and hydraulic stress related risks. 
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Fig. 5. Neptune: pipes at risk according to the web service developed in the ICeWater project 
 
Fig. 6. Abbiategrasso: pipes at risk according to the web service developed in the ICeWater project 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper the use of network analysis for operationalizing resilience/vulnerability concepts in a WDN has 
been proposed. While general measures and graph clustering algorithm have been used in order to evaluate and 
compare connectivity and resilience of three different WDNs, the application of hydraulic simulation has also 
permitted to estimate the chance for pipe breakage/failure depending on the current usage of the infrastructure. 
The results of this study have been used to develop an enhanced asset management decision support functionality 
of the ICeWater project, provided as a web service, specifically devoted to assist WDN managers in the definition of 
the most suitable intervention/rehabilitation plan, even preventive. The next goal is to make the enhanced asset 
management functionality able to prioritize the hydraulic components according to integrated information on 
vulnerability/resilience, strain/usage and probability of break based on historical data of interventions. 
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A further layer of analysis that can be added consists in further joining network analysis and hydraulic 
simulation: while the set of resilience indices can be used to identify the pipe whose failure impacts the connectivity 
of the infrastructure, the simulation of the damaged network provides a measure about how a damaged component 
impacts the service level still offered by the WDN. 
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